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Chapter 3
A Trust Rooted in Ignorance: Why Ānanda’s Lack of 
Understanding Makes Him a Reliable Witness to 
the Buddha’s Teachings
Jonathan A. Silk
Whatever may be the truth of its posited etymological connection with the 
term “religion,” there is no doubt that the Latin behind the English word “reli-
able” is religāre, originally meaning something like a strong binding together, 
later pointing to association and confident dependence. We normally judge 
persons—friends, for instance—to be reliable for various positive reasons, 
such as because of their wisdom, compassion or honesty, but it is probably rare 
that we place our deep trust and reliance in an individual because of their ig­
norance. But paradoxically, it may indeed sometimes be precisely ignorance 
that is held up in justification of faith. The present small contribution offers an 
example from the Indian Buddhist commentarial tradition of one such case.1
Canonically accepted Indian Buddhist scriptures—in the first place, 
sūtras—are universally held within the tradition to be reliable accounts of the 
salvifically potent teachings of the Buddha, and the reasoning behind this is 
relatively clear. A popular American Christian hymn of 1859 avers: “Jesus loves 
me—this I know, for the Bible tells me so.”2 The same logic applies to Buddhist 
scriptures: the Buddha is to be trusted, he is omniscient, and he is infinitely 
compassionate—and we know this since the sūtras tell us so. But how do we 
know that the scriptures themselves are reliable? No doubt precisely in order 
to forestall such potential challenges, Buddhist scriptures assert their reliabil-
ity by means of an internal seal of their own authenticity, namely the stock 
phrase with which they regularly begin: “Thus I have heard” (evaṁ mayā 
śrutam). Commentaries on Buddhist scriptures discuss this opening stock 
1 I am preparing an extensive study of commentarial interpretations of the opening stock 
phrase of Buddhist sūtras, on which the present contribution may be seen as a report on one 
small issue. My thanks to my colleagues Rafal Felbur, Peter Szanto, Gregory Forgues, Berthe 
Jansen, and especially Michael Radich, for kind corrections, particularly to my translations, 
and to Maghiel van Crevel for suggestions toward clarity and style.
2 Wikipedia tells us that its author was the American Anna Bartlett Warner (<https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Bartlett_Warner>), <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesus_
Loves_Me>. Accessed 27.10.2019.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC 4.0 license.
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phrase in detail, and interpret the “I” here to verify the validity of the ensuing 
discourse in the following manner: the account is authentic because the speak-
er, the Buddha’s amanuensis (so to speak) and the compiler of his sermons (the 
saṁgītikāra, the reciter, that is, at the First Council), the monk Ānanda, who 
accompanied him through most of his preaching career, reliably reports what 
he heard directly from the Buddha—that is, he reports it thus (Sanskrit evaṁ), 
precisely as he heard it. Ānanda, however, although he recounts and reports 
the teaching, is clearly not its author. He merely conveys. What becomes im-
portant for some commentators is the question whether Ānanda understood 
what the Buddha preached. The point of the present contribution is to show 
how the answer given by some commentators converts what could have been 
a potential weakness into a great strength, via what we might think of as a sort 
of rhetorical Aikidō. 
The link between reliability and understanding is not limited to Buddhist 
lore. The great Indian Epic the Mahābhārata contains a passage—which clear-
ly very much post-dates the composition of its core—that depicts the seer-
poet Vyāsa employing the elephant-headed god Gaṇeśa as his scribe. In this 
passage we read:3
… vyāsenoktas tadānagha ||
lekhako bhāratasyāsya bhava tvaṁ gaṇanāyaka |
mayaiva procyamānasya mahasā kalpitasya ca ||
śrutvaitat prāha vighneśo yadi me lekhanī kṣaṇam |
likhato nāvatiṣṭheta tadā syāṁ lekhako hy aham ||
vyāso ’py uvāca taṁ devam abuddhvā mā likha kvacit |
om ity uktvā gaṇeśo ’pi babhūva kila lekhakaḥ ||
Vyāsa then said to him, “Gaṇeśa, you must be the scribe for this Bhārata 
as I compose it in my head and speak it forth.” The lord of obstacles re-
plied, “If my pen does not stop for an instant as I write, I shall be the 
3 The passage, belonging only to a few of the collated manuscripts of the Mahābhārata, is found 
in an appendix to Vishnu S. Sukthankar et al., The Mahābhārata: For the First Time Critically 
Edited, vol. 1 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1933), 884, in the note to line 36 
of passage 1, lines 6–12. The translation is that of James L. Fitzgerald, “India’s Fifth Veda: the 
Mahābhārata’s Presentation of Itself,” Journal of South Asian Literature 20.1 (1985): 125, and see 
also 138n11. See also the interesting observations of Bruno Lo Turco, “The Divine Scribe: A New 
Interpretation of the Gaṇeśa Episode from the Mahābhārata,” in A. D’Ottone Rambach, ed., 
Rivista degli Studi Orientali n.s. 90 (2018) Supplemento 1, Palaeography Between East & West. 
Proceedings of the Seminars on Arabic Palaeography at Sapienza University of Rome (Pisa & 
Rome: Fabrizio Serra Editore), 153–78, many of which bear on questions of orality and related 
issues. I owe the idea to refer to this passage to my colleague Peter Bisschop. 
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scribe.” Vyāsa replied to the god, “But never write without having compre-
hended.” “Oṁ,” said Gaṇeśa and he became the scribe.
The key phrase here is “never write without having comprehended” (abuddhvā 
mā likha kvacit), a command to which Gaṇeśa formally agrees. For the author 
of this passage, it is essential that the scribe understand what he is recording. 
While this stipulation has been understood to justify the sometimes obscure or 
even corrupt passages in the text, another way to interpret it is to link the reli-
ability of the whole Mahābhātara to this initial complete comprehension of 
the Epic’s first listener, and the individual to whom we owe our very knowledge 
of the text. Of course, it is perhaps needless to mention that, as for Ānanda so 
for the earlier reciters of the Mahābhārata as well, the text was oral and not 
written, and thus this portrayal of the role of a scribe in a late addition to the 
Epic is absolutely anachronistic. Be this as it may, the question of interest to us 
here remains the same: does reliability rely on understanding?
All philologists are well aware of the dictum that it is better to have a manu-
script of an ignorant scribe than a clever one, or rather we might say, one who 
thinks himself clever, for the clever scribe may attempt to correct or improve a 
text, while an ignorant scribe, perhaps transcribing nonsense, nevertheless of-
fers the philologist the raw materials necessary to evaluate the underlying 
source. While there is, then, at least from the philologist’s point of view, cer-
tainly something to be said for naive transmitters, one cannot correspondingly 
find that this is necessarily desirable in the oral transmission of the Buddha’s 
sermons. 
Now, some Indian Buddhist authors do seem to assume that, being in some 
respects the Buddha’s closest disciple, Ānanda certainly well understood what 
his master taught. In fact, we find this stance even in canonical literature, that 
is, in a stratum of scriptural development at least logically, if not also chrono-
logically, prior to the commentarial project. We read, then, the following in a 
passage in the Ekottārikāgama, perhaps relatively late as an Āgama text but 
nevertheless significantly earlier than the other materials we will notice here:4 
過去時, 諸佛侍者, 聞他所説, 然後乃解。然今日, 阿難比丘如來未發語, 
便解。如來意須是不須, 是皆悉知之。由此因縁, 阿難比丘勝過去時諸
佛侍者。
4 T. 125 [35.5] (II) 746c16–19, reading with the variant in the notes. I translated this passage on 
p. 199 as part of its larger context in Jonathan A. Silk, “Dressed for Success: The Monk Kāśyapa 
and Strategies of Legitimation in Earlier Mahāyāna Buddhist Scriptures,” Journal Asiatique 
291.1–2 (2004): 173–219, but here thanks to Rafal Felbur I have improved my understanding. 
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In former times, the attendants of all buddhas listened to what [those] 
other [buddhas] preached, and only thereafter understood it. But in 
these days, the monk Ānanda already understands even before the 
Tathāgata speaks. He knows through and through everything the 
Tathāgata intends and does not intend [to convey]. For this reason, the 
monk Ānanda is superior to the attendants of all buddhas of former 
times.
Here it is emphasized that Ānanda did more than understand what the Bud-
dha preached, he knew thoroughly everything that he meant (皆悉知之), and 
for this reason Ānanda is superior even to all attendants of former Buddhas. 
But perfect understanding is not necessarily obligatory, since it is also taken as 
a given that the understanding of even the most accomplished disciple is, in 
some respects, not equal to that of a buddha. In the Pāli commentarial tradi-
tion, the relevant portion of the interpretation of the opening stock phrase in 
commentaries attributed to Buddhaghosa runs as follows:5
vāyam idha ākāranidassanāvadhāraṇesu daṭṭhabbo | 
tattha ākāratthena evaṁsaddena etam athaṁ dīpeti nānānayanipuṇaṁ 
anekajjhāsayasamuṭṭhānaṁ atthabyañjanasampannaṁ vividhapāṭihāri­
yaṁ dhammatthadesanāpaṭivedhagambhīraṁ sabbasattānaṁ saka sa­
kabhāsānurūpato sotapatham āgacchantaṁ tassa bhagavato vacanaṁ 
sabbappakārena ko samattho viññātuṁ sabbathāmena pana sotukāmataṁ 
janetvāpi evaṁ me sutaṁ mayāpi ekenākārena sutan ti | …
evaṁ me sutan ti iminā pana sakalena vacanena āyasmā ānando tathā­
gappaveditaṁ dhammaṁ attano adahanto asappurisabhūmiṁ atikka­ 
mati sāvakattaṁ paṭijānanto sappurisabhūmiṁ okkamati | tathā asad­
dham mā cittaṁ vuṭṭhāpeti saddhamme cittaṁ patiṭṭhāpeti | kevalaṁ su­
tam evetaṁ mayā tasseva pana bhagavato vacanan ti dīpento attānaṁ 
parimoceti satthāraṁ apadisati jinavacanaṁ appeti dhammanettiṁ 
patiṭṭhāpeti |
api ca evaṁ me sutan ti attanā uppāditabhāvaṁ appaṭijānanto purima­
vacanaṁ vivaranto sammukhā paṭiggahitam idaṁ mayā tassa bhaga­ 
vato catuvesārajjavisāradassa dasabaladharassa āsabhaṭṭhānaṭṭhāyino 
5 All four of Buddhaghosa’s Nikāya commentaries are here virtually identical; see the begin-
nings of the commentaries on the first suttas in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, Papañcasūdanī, 
Manorathapūraṇī, and Sāratthappakāsinī. I consulted the editions of the Vipassana Research 
Society, Igatpuri India, 1993–1995. My debt to the translation of Peter Masefield, The Udāna 
Commentary (Parammatthadīpanī nāma Udānaṭṭhakathā) by Dhammapala, vol. 1 (Oxford: 
Pali Text Society, 1994), 21, 35–36 (with detailed notes, 151–52, 172–73–86), is profound. 
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sīha nā danādino sabbasattuttamassa dhammissarassa dhammarājassa 
dhammādhipatino dhammadīpassa dhammasaraṇassa saddhammavara­
cakkavattino sammāsambuddassa vacanaṁ na ettha atthe vā dhamme vā 
pade vā byañjane vā kaṅkhā vā vimati vā kattabbā ti sabbadevamanussānaṁ 
imasmiṁ dhamme assaddhiyaṁ vināseti saddhāsampadaṁ uppādeti | 
[There are many senses in which the word “Thus,” evaṁ, can appear.]
Here [in the context of the opening phrase of a scripture] this same 
[word, which has many meanings] should be seen as depicting (1) man-
ner, (2) explanation, and (3) emphatic affirmation.
 With respect to that [list of possible senses, Ānanda] using the word 
“Thus” illustrates this sense in the meaning of (1) manner [as follows]: 
Who is capable of cognizing in all its aspects the speech of the Blessed 
One, [speech which is] subtle in its many methods, that arises [to accord 
with] the many aspirations [of beings], that is perfect in letter and sense, 
[productive of] diverse miracles, profound in its teaching, sense, instruc-
tion and intellectual penetration, and which reaches the ears [of beings] 
in conformity with their own individual manner of speech? [No one is 
really capable of doing so,] still, with all my strength producing [in oth-
ers] the desire to hear [the preaching], [I say] “Thus I have heard, [mean-
ing] I too have heard in one particular manner [although there are other 
aspects of the teaching I have not grasped].” …
 Again, with the entire expression “ Thus I have heard” the Venerable 
Ānanda, not appropriating as his own the Teaching revealed by the 
Tathāgata, transcends the stage of the unworthy person, and asserting his 
status as an Arhat enters the stage of the worthy person. Thus he turns his 
mind away from what is not the True Teaching, and settles his mind in the 
True Teaching. Illustrating the claim “all this was only heard by me, while 
the expression is that of the Blessed One,” he frees himself [from any 
blame], refers to the teacher [the Buddha, as the source of the teaching], 
points to the expression of the Victor [as the authority], and establishes 
the Teaching as the guide.
 Moreover, denying with the words “Thus I have heard” that [the con-
tents of the scripture] are something produced by himself and disclosing 
that [they are rather] past utterances [of the Buddha], [he says] “I re-
ceived this expression face-to-face from the Blessed One … [and so] in 
this regard there should not be any doubt or perplexity with regard to 
meaning, doctrine, word or letter,” so removing disbelief in this Teaching 
from all gods and humans and producing an excellence of belief [in that 
Teaching]. 
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Here we see clearly that for this commentarial tradition, Ānanda avers that 
while he cannot fathom the Buddha’s teaching in its entirety, nevertheless he 
does his very best. Moreover, he is, for this commentary, an Arhat, an individual 
on the stage of a worthy person (sappurisabhūmi), that is to say, well advanced 
on the path, an issue to which we will return below, since it holds the key to our 
argument. So for Buddhaghosa—or let us say more carefully, for the tradition 
which records its ideas under his name—Ānanda understood as much of the 
Buddha’s teaching as was possible for any non-buddha, yet he claims no role in 
the production of the preaching which he heard, remembered and transmits. 
His reliability hinges on his accurate transmission of what he heard directly, 
and his strict transmission of only that.
In a similar vein, the later Pāli commentator Dhammapāla in his remarks on 
the Udāna offers the following:6
me sutan ti sāvakasampattiṁ savanasampattiñ ca niddisati paṭisam bhi­
dāpattena pañcasu ṭhānesu bhagavatā etad agge ṭhapitena dhamma bha­
ṇḍāgārikena sutabhāvadīpanato tañ ca kho mayāva sutaṁ na anus sutikaṁ 
na paramparābhatan ti imassa catthassa dīpanato | 
“I have heard” shows [Ānanda’s] excellence as an auditor and [his] excel-
lence at hearing, since it illustrates the fact that it was heard by one who 
has mastered the [four] special knowledges, one who was placed first by 
the Blessed One in five categories,7 the treasurer of the Teaching, and 
since it illustrates this sense by saying “And that I myself heard; it is not 
hearsay, it was not passed down in a traditional lineage.” 
Here, even more emphatically than in Buddhaghosa’s text, the excellences of 
Ānanda are emphasized, and his profound understanding is brought forward 
as a reason to trust him. Ānanda is a special individual, and by virtue of his 
mastery reliable, though again, his role as transmitter is not overlooked.
The same notion is found in the (mostly but not exclusively Mahāyāna) 
commentarial traditions to which we now turn, first (chronologically) in 
Jñāna garbha’s eighth-century Anantamukhanirhāradhāraṇī­ṭīkā, in which, 
6 Udānaṭṭhakathā, also cited after the edition of the Vipassana Research Society. The date of 
Dhammapāla is not known, but Kenneth Roy Norman, Pāli Literature: Including the Canonical 
Literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of All the Hīnayāna Schools of Buddhism (Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz, 1983), 137, speculatively puts him in the middle of the sixth century, and Oskar 
von Hinüber, A Handbook of Pāli Literature (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), §307, 370, in the 
second half of the same century. 
7 I believe the reference is to Aṅguttara­nikāya i.24–25 (I.xiv.4), in which five categories are 
listed in which Ānanda is the first among monks. All other monks listed are mentioned under 
just one heading. Masefield, The Udāna Commentary, has no note. 
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in commenting on the portion of the expression which follows “Thus have 
I heard”—namely, “at one time” or “on one occasion,” ekasmin samaye—the 
commentator states that this expression may be construed either with the 
preceding verb “heard” or with the following “dwelt.” That is, Jñānagarbha un-
derstands that the scripture begins by stating either that Ānanda heard the 
Buddha preach at one time, or that the Buddha on a certain occasion dwelt in 
a specific place, at which he preached. Therefore, Jñānagarbha states:8
de yang gang gi tshe gong ma dang sbyar na de’i tshe ’khor rnams kyi nges 
pa bskyed pa’i phyir bdag nyid mang du thos par bstan te | ’di ltar bdag gis 
dus gcig na thos kyi | dus gzhan na yang gzhan dag thos so || de bas na 
bdag ni mang du thos pa yin te | de’i bdag gi tshig ni yid ches par bya ba yin 
par bstan pa’i phyir ro ||
When the [statement of time] is related to the preceding [clause], in or-
der to produce certainty in the assembly it is taught that he himself 
[Ānanda] has heard much (*bahuśruta) [= is very learned]. Because it is 
taught: “Thus I have heard at one time, but at other times I heard other 
things. Therefore I have heard much [= I am very learned], and the speech 
of such an individual as I is trustworthy.” 
Here the Tibetan yid ches par bya ba perhaps points to something like Sanskrit 
pratyetavya, and means “is to be trusted or believed in.” The speaker Ānanda is 
made to assert, quite directly, his trustworthiness and reliability, solidly based 
in his learning. 
Several other commentators also emphasize the great learning of Ānanda as 
a basis for his trustworthiness, but as I have discussed the status of Ānanda as 
a reliable witness in detail elsewhere,9 I here concentrate instead on another 
interesting approach taken by one line of commentarial tradition which turns 
what should, we might imagine, have been a great handicap into the ultimate 
virtue.
The problem is this: tradition holds that Ānanda, at the time of the Buddha’s 
death and until immediately before the opening of the so-called First Council, 
was not an Arhat, that is, he was not awakened. (When the Pāli commentary 
cited above refers to him as an Arhat, it is anachronistic, since this attainment 
comes only after the Buddha’s death.) Ānanda was even at first refused entry 
8 Hisao Inagaki, The Anantamukhanirhāra­Dhāraṇī Sūtra and Jñānagarbha’s Commentary 
(Kyoto: Nagata bunshodo, 1987), 116.1–6.
9 Jonathan A. Silk, “Possible Indian Sources for the Term Tshad ma’i skyes bu as Pramāṇapuruṣa,” 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 30.2 (2002): 111–60.
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into the Council, disqualified to join this conference of saints because of his 
lack of ultimate understanding. How, therefore, being himself unable to access 
the real meaning of the Buddha’s teaching, could he be relied upon to transmit 
that teaching to others? 
Passages hinting at the crucial formulation are found for perhaps the first 
time in the late eighth century commentaries of Kamalaśīla. In his commen-
tary on the the Śālistamba­sūtra he writes:10
bdag gis thos pa zhes bya ba ’di gnyis kyis ni | bdag gis mngon sum du thos 
pa dang | rtogs pa ma yin par ston te | bdag nyid kyis thos kyi thos pa gcig 
nas gcig du brgyud pa las ’ongs pa ni ma yin no || thos su zad kyi rtogs pa ma 
yin te | sangs rgyas ma gtogs par gzhan kyis ’di lta bu’i don rtogs mi srid pa’i 
phyir ro || de yang yid ches par bya ba’i rgyu yin te | gzhan du na mi srid pa’i 
don smras na yid ches par mi gyur ro ||
These two [words], “I heard,” indicate that I heard directly and that I did 
not understand [its meaning]; I myself heard, but what was heard is not 
passed down through a traditional lineage from one person to another. It 
was merely heard, but not understood, because it is impossible that an-
other besides the/a Buddha [could] understand a matter such as this. 
That [statement that the reciter is not responsible for the contents, but 
rather the Buddha himself]11 also is a cause for inducing belief; other-
wise, if an impossible matter were stated, it would not be convincing.
We are fortunate that, in the absence of a known Sanskrit version of this com-
mentary, we do have a Chinese translation, produced by the famous ’Gos Chos 
grub (Chinese Facheng 法成), a bilingual monk living in Tibetan-occupied 
Dunhuang in the ninth century.12 In light of the fact that Kamalaśīla lived in 
10 Jeffrey D. Schoening, The Śālistamba Sūtra and Its Indian Commentaries (Vienna: Ar beits-
kreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1995), 455.4–9. 
11 See Schoening, The Śālistamba Sūtra, 202 n. 9. 
12 The existence of this translation was discovered by Yoshimura Shūki 芳村修基, and ed-
ited by him in a bilingual edition, Kamarashīra­cho Daijō Tōkangyō no Chūshaku: Chibet­
to­bun to Hōjō­shi no Kanshakubun Taishō カマラシーラ著大乗 稲芋經の註釋: チベ
ット文と法成師の漢釋文對照 (Kyoto: Ryūkoku Daigaku Tōhō Seiten Kenkyūkai, 
1959). It was studied by Ueyama Daishun 上山大峻 in his comprehensive study of Chos 
grub, “Daiban-koku Daitoku Sanzō Hōshi Shamon Hōjō no Kenkyū” 大蕃國大徳三藏法
師沙門法成の研究, Tōhō Gakuhō 東方學報 38 (1967), 133–98; 39 (1968), 119–222. Re-
printed in Ajia Bunkashi Ronsō アジア文化史論叢 I [Contributions to West, Central 
and North Asian Studies: Collected Papers of Liu­sha Hai­hsi (流沙海西) Scholarship 
Prize Winners] (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan, 1978), 1–179; in the latter the relevant pages 
are 96–105. 
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the late eighth century, and that Facheng was active during the Tibetan occu-
pation of Dunhuang around 780–850, we may tentatively conclude that our 
manuscripts of the text date almost to the lifetime of Kamalaśīla himself. The 
Chinese version corresponding to that translated above from Tibetan has the 
following:13
言「我聞」者, 此二顯其親聞, 非自證也。爲自親聞, 無傳聞過失, 所以
立「我」。但聞非證故, 立於「聞」, 除佛一人, 餘則不能了此義故。若
言「自證」, 不生信故。
As for saying “I heard,” these two [words] make clear that he heard it di-
rectly, and not that he himself understood it. As he himself directly heard 
it, without errors of transmission, thus [the text] speaks of “I.” Because he 
merely heard it, but did not understand it, [the text] speaks of “hearing,” 
because with the sole exception of the/a Buddha, no one is capable of 
fully penetrating this meaning. So if [the text] were to say “I understood,” 
this would not engender trust [in the audience].
The argument is clear: if Ānanda were to claim his own presentation of the 
teaching, when difficult points would arise, listeners would doubt their validity 
and veracity. Only by denying not only authorship but even understanding, 
and maintaining that his role is nothing more than accurately transmitting 
what the Buddha said, can Ānanda ensure the trustworthiness of his account. 
His reliability, therefore, is assured precisely by his lack of (complete) under-
standing. We might, then, articulate this argument more fully as follows: If I, 
Ānanda, were to claim understanding, you might wonder whether I were para-
phrasing the Buddha’s teachings, and then, when you had doubt, you might 
blame me. But I do not claim understanding or authorship, and my own lack of 
understanding (which you will expect, knowing that I am not an Arhat) as-
sures this.
In his commentary on the Vajracchedikā, Kamalaśīla deploys some of the 
same terminology as that in the passage quoted immediately above, and seen 
earlier in a Pāli passage:14
13 Dasheng Daoyujing suiting shoujingji 大乘稻芋經隨聽手鏡記, T. 2782 (LXXXV) 546c14–
17. The facing Chinese and Tibetan texts are found in Yoshimura, Kamarashīra­cho Daijō 
Tōkangyō no Chūshaku, 35–38. Ueyama, “Daiban-koku,” 101, contains a table with a Japa-
nese translation of our passage from the Tibetan (of the Peking Tanjur) and the corre-
sponding Chinese text (from the Taishō edition), with the correspondences marked in the 
Chinese (although not entirely clearly). 
14 Derge Tanjur 3817, shes phyin, ma, 205a4–5; Dh = IOL Tib J 177 57b1.
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thos pa zhes bya ba ni rtogs pa dgag par byed de | sangs rgyas ma gtogs par 
chos ’di lta bu dag rang gis rtogs pa gzhan med pa’i phyir ro || ’dis ni yid mi 
ches pa sel bar byed do || 
“Have heard” eliminates [the notion of the contents being] understood, 
because besides the/a Buddha there is none other who can understand 
such teachings as these on his own. This clears up [whatever] distrust 
[there might be in the authority of the teachings].
Again, in his Saptaśatikā­Prajñāpāramitā­ṭīkā Kamalaśīla expresses the same 
idea in slightly different terms:15 
thos pa zhes bya ba ni rna ba’i rnam par shes pas rjes su myong ba yin gyi | 
rtogs pa ni ma yin te | chos ’di lta bu de bzhin gshegs pa ma gtogs par gzhan 
gyis khong du chud pa’i mthu med pa’i phyir ro || 
“Have heard” means experienced through the aural cognition (*śrotra­
vijñāna), but not ‘understanding,’ because no one other than the/a 
Tathāgata has the power to fully comprehend teachings such as this.
Finally, in his Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī­ṭīkā Kamalaśīla refers to others who 
heard and transmitted sūtras from the Buddha, asserting that like Ānanda they 
too did not fully understand what they heard:16 
thos pa zhes bya ba ’dis ni bdag gis ma rtogs so zhes bya ba bstan pa ste | 
thos par zad kyi rtogs pa med par rnam pa gcod pa’o || chos kyi dbyings 
thugs su chud pa ’phags pa ’jam ba’i dbyangs la sogs pa theg pa chen po 
yang dag par sdud par byed par grags mod kyi | ’on kyang sang rgyas dang 
’dra bar ’di ’dra ba’i chos rnam pa thams cad du rtogs pa gzhan la mi srid 
de | de bas na de dag gis kyang | bdag nyid yang dag par sdud par byed par 
khas blangs pas mdo sde’i don rnam pa thams cad du ma rtogs so zhes ston 
to || gzhan du na ni de nyid ston pa por ’gyur te | yang dag par sdud par byed 
pa ma yin no || de nyid ni yid ches par byed pa’i rgyu ste | gzhan du na mi 
srid pa’i don smras na yid ches par mi ’gyur ba’i phyir ro || 
With this “Have heard” [the reciter] indicates “I did not understand”; this 
specifies that [I] only heard but am without understanding. Although the 
15 Derge Tanjur 3815, shes phyin, ma 89b3–4.
16 Derge Tanjur 4000, mdo ’grel, ji, 124b4–7.
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Noble Mañjughoṣa and others who comprehend the dharmadhātu are 
indeed celebrated as reciters of Mahāyāna [scriptures], nevertheless 
those other [than the/a Buddha] do not have the comprehensive under-
standing in all its aspects of such a teaching as does the/a Buddha, and 
therefore since they too acknowledge “I indeed am [no more than] a re-
citer,” this indicates that [they] do not understand the meaning of the 
scripture in all its aspects. Otherwise, the focus here would be on the 
teacher, not the reciter. Precisely [the reciter] is the cause of inspiring 
confidence, since otherwise if [some seemingly] impossible matter were 
mentioned, there would be no confidence. 
Here Kamalaśīla offers an example of the kind of difficult teaching he imagines 
might provoke doubt in an audience, namely the idea that some things are, or 
seem to be, impossible (*asambhava?). As above, if upon encountering such a 
teaching one were required to trust Ānanda or another reciter as the ultimate 
authority, one might hesistate to trust the truth of the teaching, a potential 
problem avoided by stressing that both the teaching and its interpretation are 
solely the responsibility not of the fallible reciter but rather of the Buddha, 
who is of course omniscient and inerrant.
Vīryaśrīdatta, also belonging to the eighth century and author of the Ni­
bandhana commentary to the Arthaviniścaya­sūtra (incidentally a non-
Mahāyāna text, demonstrating that the arguments offered here are in no way 
exclusively Mahāyāna), begins to point out the logic at play in this argument, 
when he writes:17
śrutam iti śrotravijñānenodgr̥hītam | anena tasmin sambhave ’dhiga­
mābhāvaṁ darśayati | paścād adhigamasambhave balavaiśāradyā­ 
dīnāṁ buddhadharmāṇām āveṇikānām anabhisamayāt śrutam iti na 
virudhy ate | 
“Have heard” means acquired by aural cognition. This points out with 
this [expression] that on that occassion he had not obtained the state of 
comprehension [of the teaching, he merely heard it]. Even if there is the 
possibility of comprehension later [after the Buddha’s death, when 
Ānanda finally became an Arhat], because [at the time he heard this 
preaching] he had not realized the particular qualities definitive of a 
17 N.H. Samtāni, The Arthaviniścaya­sūtra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana) (Patna: 
K. P. Ja yas wal Research Institute, 1971), 75.5–8. I read with the manuscript sambhave 
against the editor’s samaye.
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buddha, the powers, fearlessnesses and so on, it is not inconsistent to say 
“Have heard” [rather than “understood”]. 
What is explicitly denied here is any adhigama, “understanding” or perhaps 
even better “mastery.” Ānanda is not an Arhat at the time he hears the Buddha’s 
teachings, so he cannot claim to have understood them, only to have heard and 
memorized them.
Another (anonymous) commentary to the same scripture, the Arthavini­
ścaya­ṭīkā, goes all the way and connects the dots:18
thos zhes bya ba ni rna ba’i dbang po rnam par dag pa dang ldan pa’i rna 
ba’i rnam par shes pas don dang tshig ma nor bar gzung zhes bya ba’i don 
te | des ni khong du chud pa med par ston to || de ci’i phyir zhe na | gang gi 
tshe bcom ldan ’das las ’phags pa dga’ bos mdo ’di mngon sum du thos pa 
de’i tshe | ’phags pa dga’ bos bden ba rtog pa med de bcom ldan ’das mya 
ngan las ’das pa’i ’og tu bden pa mthong ba’i phyir ro || 
“Have heard” means the meaning and the words were grasped without 
error by the aural cognition possessing the correct faculty of hearing, and 
not understood [by the reciter, who has merely reported and not inter-
preted through his understanding]. Why? Because at the time when the 
Noble Ānanda heard this scripture directly from the Blessed One the 
Noble Ānanda lacked understanding of the truth, and [only] after the 
nirvāṇa of the Blessed One did he come to see the truth [and become an 
Arhat]. 
Although we need not consider the complex and in some respects different 
Buddhist tantric tradition in detail here, in order to illustrate the generalities of 
this view across Buddhist traditions we might just briefly cite from the tantric 
Candrakīrti, who in his Pradīpoddyotana commentary to the Guhyasamāja­
tantra says the following:19 
mayeti sākṣān na paramparayā śrutaṁ nādhigatam |
“I” means that it was heard directly personally by me, not through a tradi-
tional lineage, nor did I understand it.
18 Derge Tanjur 4365, sna tshogs, nyo 3a7-b1.
19 Anonymous edition in Dhīḥ 48 2009, 132.15. This is apparently a revised edition of Chinta-
haran Chakravarti, Guhyasamājatantrapradīpodyotanaṭīkā­ṣaṭkoṭivyākhyā (Patna: K.P. 
Ja yas wal Research Institute, 1984), in which the passage with several mistakes is found at 
11.25–26.
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Finally, while not, to be sure, an Indian text, the Korean Wŏnch’ŭk’s (613–696) 
圓測 commentary on the Sandhinirmocana­sūtra, the Haesimmilgyŏng so 解深
密經疏, is nevertheless worthwhile briefly noting for its treatment of the rele-
vant portion of the opening passage:20
又微細律明其阿難當登高座出法藏時, 身即如佛, 具諸相好。若下高座, 
還復本形。眾見此瑞, 有三種疑。一疑, 大師釋迦, 以慈悲故, 從涅槃起, 
更宣深法。二疑, 諸餘世尊從他方來。三疑, 阿難比丘既是佛弟, 堪代其
兄, 轉身成佛。今欲遣三疑, 故云 「如是我聞」等七事。明「乃是我親
從佛聞, 非關慈悲從涅槃起, 亦非餘佛他方來, 又非我已轉身成佛, 自說
經也」。
Again, the Kṣudrakavastu of the [Mūlasarvāstivāda] Vinaya tells the story 
that at the time when Ānanda was about to mount the high seat to pro-
claim the Dharmapiṭaka [at the First Council], his body was just like that 
of the/a buddha, replete with the major and minor bodily marks. When 
he descended from the high seat, his body returned to its original form. 
When the assembly saw this wonder, they had three kinds of doubts. 
1. They wondered whether the great Śākya teacher, out of compassion, 
had arisen from nirvāṇa to once again proclaim the profound teaching. 
2. They wondered whether other Blessed Ones had come from another 
world. 3. They wondered whether the monk Ānanda, being the younger 
brother of the Buddha, had been able to take the place of his elder broth-
er, transform his body and become a buddha. Now, in order to remove 
these three doubts [Ānanda] states the seven items [making up the 
nidāna] beginning “Thus I have heard.” He does so to clarify that “Pre-
cisely, I heard it directly from the Buddha; it is not the case that out of 
compassion he arose from nirvāṇa; it is not that other buddhas came 
from elsewhere; and again it is not that I myself transformed my body, 
became a buddha and [now] preach the sūtra myself.” 
Here in this rich passage the text makes clear that in no way is the teaching to 
be attributed to Ānanda and that, while his preaching might be confused with 
20 Found in the Zokuzōkyō, X21n0369_p0180b12–19, online at <http://tripitaka.cbeta.org/
X21n0369_001>. Its Tibetan translation at Derge Tanjur 4016 was made from the Chinese 
by the above-mentioned Facheng, this passage being found at mdo ’grel, ti 38a2–6. When 
the Chinese is open to interpretation I allow myself to be guided by the Tibetan. A very 
similar though abbreviated version is found in the Ārya­Laṅkāvatāra­nāma­mahāyāna­
sūtravrtt̥i Tathāgatahrd̥ayālaṁkāra­nāma attributed to Jñānavajra, Derge Tanjur 4019, 
mdo ’grel, pi 6b3–6; I do not know if the debt of this commentary to that of Wŏnch’ŭk has 
been studied. 
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the preaching of a present buddha, perhaps because the act of preaching car-
ries with it such gravitas, Ānanda was no buddha and did not preach on his 
own accord, offering merely a repetition of what he had learned. 
The lesson to be gained from the short survey here is that commentators 
within the Buddhist tradition faced a problem: Ānanda is the authority for the 
Buddha’s teaching for later audiences, since it was he who recited the sermons 
at the First Council, where they were canonized. However, he was known by 
the tradition to have been unawakened during the Buddha’s lifetime, that is, at 
the time he actually heard these preachings. The authority for the Buddha’s 
word, then, was explicitly not authoritative. But this is where the genius of the 
commentarial mind shows itself: what could have been a weakness—and we 
might contrast the thoroughly comprehending Gaṇeśa here—is deftly turned 
into a strength: it was precisely Ānanda’s lack of ability to understand, and thus 
inability to paraphrase, to cite one key implication, that made necessary his 
rote recital, and it is precisely this, in turn, that made possible all later access to 
the exact words spoken by the Buddha: all reliable transmission of the Bud-
dha’s teachings, and our consequent justified confidence in that transmission, 
was made possible precisely and only by Ānanda’s ignorance. 
The brief series of passages surveyed here raises a small but interesting 
point in the rhetoric and exegetical logic of Buddhist commentarial tradition, 
which in a broader frame is, of course, unsurprising: nothing in the tradition 
cannot be explained (away) as perfectly in harmony with a grand plan, so to 
speak, or put another way, there are no inconsistencies, if only one looks from 
the correct perspective. (This attitude is of course not unique to the Buddhist 
tradition, and one might think immediately of the Talmudic traditions as offer-
ing another vivid example of the same reasoning.) It is well known that in 
many circumstances Buddhist authors appeal to the notion of skillful means 
(upāya), through which any apparent inconsistency or contradiction in the 
Buddha’s teaching may be shown to be nothing other than a manifestation of 
the flexibility and adaptability of his salvific efforts. The approach in the pas-
sages cited above is different, but in at least one dimension similar: what seems 
like a problem is shown, when seen correctly, to be not a deficiency but rather 
on the contrary its polar opposite, an essential building block of the tradition. 
The trust engendered by this logic is the key to the strong binding that defines 
reliability, something one feels as well, though on a less empyrean level per-
haps, with friendship. It is, of course, needless to say that most feelings of re-
spect, trust and appreciation do not normally stem from perceptions of 
ignorance or other weaknesses, and they require no rhetorical gymnastics to 
justify their counterintuitive conclusions. Indeed, if we can trace their roots at 
all such feelings appear to grow from shared worldviews, perhaps manifest in a 
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sense of humor or common value system. With all this in mind, it is with over-
whelming pleasure that, with sincerest wishes for the long continuation of a 
real bond of heartfelt friendship, I offer this small paper to the health and hap-
piness of my dear friend Albert Hoffstädt.
